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Albert: Transportation Management: The Validation of Wright Line

COMMENT
TRANSPORTATION MANAGEMENT
THE VALIDATION OF WRIGHT LINE
INTRODUCTION

Section 8(a)(3)' of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or the

"Act")2 makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to encourage or
discourage union membership by discriminating against employees. An

indispensable element of an alleged §8(a)(3) violation is employer motivation.3 There are four prerequisites for establishing a violation of §8(a)(3):
the union activity; the employer's knowledge of an employee's union
5
activity;4 the employer's animus towards an employee's union activity;
and, a causal connection between the employee's union activity and the
employer's discriminatory conduct. 6 A -violationoccurs when an employer
discharges or imposes a lesser penalty against an employee because of that

employee's membership in or support for the union. Classic examples of
§8(a)(3) violations include: unlawfully discharging an employee who is
known to be active in a union organizing campaign; 7 unlawfully discharging an employee who refuses to work scheduled overtime when the real
reason for discharge is the employee's union activity;8 transferring a dayshift employee to night-shift work to discourage union activity; 9 and,
I. 29 U.S.C. §158(a)(3) (1976). Section 8(a)(3) provides, in pertinent part:
"It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-.. . (3) by discrimination in regard to
hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or
discourage membership in any labor organization...."
2. U.S.C. §§151-169 (1976).
3. Cf. Jackson and Heller, The Irrelevance of the Wright Line Debate: Returning to the
Realism ofErie Resistorin UnfairLabor PracticeCases, 77 Nw. U.L. REv. 737 (1983) (suggests that
the Wright Line "motive" analysis used in §8(a)(3) yield to the "balancing of interests" analysis, as
expressed in NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221 (1963) and NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers,
Inc., 388 U.S. 26 (1967)).
4. Either actual provable knowledge required (American Thread Co., Servier Plant, 242
N.L.R.B. 27, 101 L.R.R.M. 1093 (1979)), or inferrable knowledge adequate (E. Mishan & Sons, Inc.,
242 N.L.R.B. 1344, 101 L.R.R.M. 1344 (1979)).
5. Either direct evidence necessary (W.H. Scott d/bla Scott's Wood Prods., 242 N.L.R.B.
1193. 101 L.R.R.M. 1449 (1979) or inferrential evidence satisfactory (NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers,
Inc., 388 U.S. 26 (1967); Wallace Metal Prods., Inc., 244 N.L.R.B. 41, 102 L.R.R.M. 1233 (1979)).
6. See Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17,42-45 (1954).
7. Commercial Testing & Engineering Co., 262 N.L.R.B. 786, 110 L.R.R.M. 1364 (1982)
(employer contends that the employee missed a work shift, however employer did not discharge other
employees for first offense of missing shift).
8. Moore Co., Div. of Easco Corp., 264 N.L.R.B. No. 159, 111 L.R.R.M. 1382 (1982) (coworker who also refused to work scheduled overtime was not disciplined).
9. Harrison Steel Castings Co., 262 N.L.R.B. 450, 110 L.R.R.M. 1424 (1982).
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unlawfully discharging two non-unit employees who fail to attend an
anti-union rally.10
The Act does not specify the degree of "discriminatory intent" necessary to make out a §8(a)(3) violation. If the employer's action is completely divorced from union activity, it is lawful. An employer may fire
any employee for any cause, good or bad-or no cause at all-as long as
anti-union sentiment is absent from the decision.II However, where there
is evidence of both proper and improper reasons for termination or other
discriminatory conduct, the test used to determine the employer's motive
will likewise determine the outcome of the case.
There are two contexts in which a §8(a)(3) violation may occur: the
"pretext" case and the "dual motive" case. Labor law commentators and
practitioners concur that an employer rarely will declare that an employee
was disciplined solely because of an abhorrence of unions or because it
simply "will not tolerate employees engaging in union or other protected
activities.' 2 Instead, the employer ordinarily claims that the discipline
was enacted for a legitimate business reason or for "work-related reasons,
such as incompetence or insubordination; the employee or the union,
however, contends that the discharge [or other disciplinary action] was a
13
product of anti-union animus."
Careful inspection of the evidence concerning the employer's intent
or motive 14 may disclose that the business justification asserted by the
employer was nonexistent or was not relied upon by the employer. In
fact, this purported rationale is a sham-nothing "more than an after-thefact cover-up for discipline which is discriminatorily motivated."1 5 Thus,
the employer's stated motive was a mere "pretext".

10.

Id.
See Radio Officers' Union, 347 U.S. at 42-45. See also Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v.
NLRB, 449 F.2d 511 (5th Cir. 1971) (employer lawfully discharged employee engaged in an economic
strike for shouting obscenities and using vulgar hand signs); Federal Mogul Corp. v. NLRB, 566 F.2d
1245 (5th Cir. 1978) (employer lawfully discharged employee for excessive absenteeism during the
course of a union campaign).
12. -Wright Line, A Division of Wright Line, Inc., 251 N.L.R.B. 1083, 1083, 105 L.R.R.M.
1169, 1170 (1980), enforced, 662 F.2d 899 (Ist Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 989 (1982).

11.

13.

R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 137

(1977).
14. The terms "intent" and "motive" are often used synonymously by both the Board and the
courts. See Christensen and Svanoe, Motive and Intent in the Commission of Unfair LaborPractices:
The Supreme Court and the Fictive Formality,77 YALEL.J. 1269,1271 n.4 (1968). Cf. Oberer, The
Scienter Factorin Sections 8(a)(1) and (3) ofthe Labor Act: ofBalancing,Hostile Motive, Dogsand
Tails, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 491 (1967) (intent and motive represent distinguishable concepts and should
be used as such).
15. A. Cox, D. BOK &R. GORMAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LABOR LAW 232-33 (9th ed.
1981).
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A "dual motive" 16 case exists where both a legitimate business reason
and an anti-union animus contribute to the employer's discipline of the
employee. 17 The coexistence of both "lawful" and "unlawful" reasons for
the employer's action requires "further inquiry into the role played by
each motive and hds spawned substantial controversy in §8(a)(3) litigation." 8 '
Though, as a matter of fact, the distinction between "pretext" and
"dual motive" cases persists, the National Labor Relations Board's
(NLRB or the "Board') 1980 Wright Line decision purports to nullify
this distinction.' 9
The degree of anti-union motivation needed to support a §8(a)(3)
violation has remained as divergent as the motives themselves. 20 From the
Act's inception, the NLRB, empowered to enforce the federal labor
laws,2 ' has utilized a variety of causation tests22 to analyze employer
motivation in §8(a)(3) cases. Because of the multitude of causation tests
employed by the Board, a great deal of confusion has ensued among the
circuit courts. The vexation of §8(a)(3) litigation was apparently quieted
when the Board, in Wright Line,23 adopted a causation test which it
hoped would unify the courts.
Against this background, the Wright Line causation test was conceived. The test itself is clear:
First, we shall require that the General Counsel make a primafacie
showing sufficient to support the inference that protected conduct was

a "motivating factor" in the employer's decision. Once this is established, the burden will shift to the employer to demonstrate that the
same action would have taken place even in the absence of the protected conduct. 24

16. This also is commonly referred to as a "mixed motive" case.
17. 1980 LAB. REL REP. YEARBOOK (BNA) 171 (address by former Board Member Truesdale).
See also Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. 1083, 105 L.R.R.M. 1169 (1980).
18. Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. at 1084, 105 L.R.R.M. at 1170 (citation omitted).
19. Id. at 1083 n.4, 1089 n.13, 105 L.R.R.M. at 1170 n.4, 1174 n.13. The drafters of §10(c) of
the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 assumed that an employee was discharged either "for
cause" or as retribution for union activity. It was presumed that the employer acted with unlawful
intent in the absence of any legitimate business reason. The notion of a "dual" or "mixed" motive
discharge, see supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text, was not contemplated. Hence, the Act's
silence on dual/mixed motive discharges. See also infra notes 141-42 and accompanying text
(referring to the "for cause" proviso, §10(c), of the Act).
20. See supra notes 7-10 and accompanying text.
21. 29 U.S.C. §153 (1976).
22. See infra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
23. Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. 1083, 105 L.R.R.M. 1169 (1980).
24. id. at 1089, 105 L.R.R.M. at 1175 (citation omitted).
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In practice, however, the test is aloof, disjointed and often spurned. The
circuit courts did not unanimously approve this test and thus remained
25
sharply divided in their treatment of §8(a)(3) cases.
The United States Supreme Court ended the legal debate and
approved the Board's standard in NLRB v. TransportationManagement
Corporation.26 In essence, the Court held that the employer has the
burden of proof to establish whether an employee was discharged for
union activities or for legitimate business reasons. Prior to the Supreme
Court's decision, the ultimate disposition of a §8(a)(3) allegation depended
on the fortuity of the case's jurisdictional/geographical location. This was
not a desirable situation.27
This comment briefly examines the pre-Wright Line causation
analyses used by the Board, and how the Board's widely used "in part"
28
test and the renegade "but for" test clouded the issues of §8(a)(3).
Ultimately, the Board developed the Wright Line standard to clarify the
confusion of §8(a)(3) causation analysis, 29 due primarily to the divergent
treatment it received by the circuit courts. 30 The result was the Supreme
Court's decision in TransportationManagement.
TransportationManagement,31 which sanctioned the Wright Line
approach, will be critically examined from three perspectives: constitutional versus statutory applications of causation analysis; 32 evidentiary
rules; 33 and the policy of judicial deference. 34 Finally, an alternative causation analysis for §8(a)(3), the "true purpose/ actual motive" test,3 5 will be
considered.
"IN PART" VERSUS "BUT FOR"

Prior to its decision in Wright Line, the Board applied the "in part"
causation test to determine whether the Act had been violated in a

25.

See infra notes 83-94 and accompanying text.

26. NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., -

U.S.

-

103 S.Ct. 2469 (1983).

27. Certainty and predictability of the law, based on legal precedent, are important elements of
a legal system. The doctrine of stare decisis is founded upon the "important policy considerations ... in favor of continuity and predictability in the law... Such considerations are present
and, in a field as delicate as labor relations, extremely important." Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail

Clerk's Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 257 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting).

28.

See infra notes 36-52 and accompanying text.

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

See infra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 66-95 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 96-157 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 158-78 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 179-207 and accompanying text.

34. See infra notes 208-20 and accompanying text.
35.

See infra notes 221-33 and accompanying text.
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§8(a)(3) dual motivation case. The "in part" test reasons that "if a discharge is motiviated, 'in part,' by the protected activities of the employee
the discharge violates the Act even if a legitimate business reason also was
relied on. 3 6 The Board's ad hoc approach in dual motive cases yielded
numerous variations on this "in part" language 37 and created considerable
confusion among the circuits. 38 The Sixth,39 Seventh,40 Tenth 4l and, on
occasion, the Ninth 42 and District of Columbia 43 Circuits, have applied
the "in part" analysis to dual motive cases.
Several of the circuits, most notably the First, were highly critical of
the Board's "in part" analysis. In response, the First Circuit enunciated its
own causation test for analyzing dual motive cases. This test provides that
"when both a 'good' and 'bad' reason for discharge exist, the burden is
upon the General Counsel to establish that, in the absence of protected
activities, the discharge would not have taken place." 44 This test was
designated the "dominant motive" or "but for" standard. 45 Following the
lead of the First Circuit were the Fouth46 and, on occasion, the Ninth 47
and District of Columbia48 Circuits.
36. Wright Line, 251 NLRB at 1084, 105 L.R.R.M. at 1170. See Youngstown Osteopathic
Hosp. Ass'n, 224 N.L.R.B. 574, 575, 92 L.R.R.M. 1328, 1330 (1976).
37. See, e.g., Bankers Warehouse Co., 146 N.L.R.B. 1197, 1200, 56 L.R.R.M. 1045, 1047
(1964) ("the motivating or moving cause'); Tursair Fueling, Inc., 151 N.L.R.B. 270, 271 n.2. 58
L.R.R.M. 1426 (1965) ("the motivating factor"); Erie Sand S.S. Co., 189 N.L.R.B. 63, 63 n.l, 76
L.R.R.M. 1542, 1543 (197 1) ("the substantial, contributing factor"); P.P.G. Indus., 229 N.L.R.B. 713,
717, 95 L.R.R.M. 1366, 1371 (1977) ("motivated principally"); Broyhill Co., 210 N.L.R.B. 288, 296,
86 L.R.R.M. 1158 (1974) ("a substantial cause"); KBM Electronic, Inc., t/a Carsounds, 218 N.L.R.B.
1352. 1358.89 L.R.R.M. 1728 (1975) ("a substantial or motivating ground"); Central Casket Co., 225
N.L.R.B. 362, 92 L.R.R.M. 1547, 1548 (1976) ("in substantial part").
38. See infra notes 39-52 and accompanying text.
39. See, e.g., NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union, Local 876, 570 F.2d 586, 590 (6th Cir.
1978), cert. denied,439 U.S. 819 (1978) (a §8(a)(4) discharge); NLRB v. Adam Loos Boiler Works
Co., 435 F.2d 707 (6th Cir. 1970).
40. See, e.g., Nacker Packing Co. v. NLRB, 615 F.2d 456,459-60 (7th Cir. 1980).
41. See, e.g., M.S.P. Indus., d/b/a The Larimer Press v. NLRB, 568 F.2d 166, 173-74(10th
Cir. 1977).
42. See. e.g., Penasquitos Village, Inc. v. NLRB, 565 F.2d 1074, 1082-83 (9th Cir. 1977).
43. See, e.g., Allen v. NLRB, 561 F.2d 976, 982 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
44. Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. at 1085, 105 L.R.R.M. at 1172. See NLRB v. Lowell Sun
Publishing Co., 320 F.2d 835, 842 (ist Cir. 1963) (Aldrich, J., concurring); Coletti's Furniture, Inc. v.
NLRB, 550 F.2d 1292, 1293 (Ist Cir. 1977). But see NLRB v. Eastern Smelting and Refining
Corp., 598 F.2d 666 (Ist Cir. 1979) (Although the court applied the Mt. Healthy standard, the court
did not explicity abandon its "but for" analysis nor did it embrace the "in part" standard. The
court merely concluded that the "Board's decision may be correct for the wrong reason.").
45. Namely, butfor the protected activity the employee would not have been discharged.
46. See, e.g., NLRB v. Patrick Plaza Dodge, Inc., 522 F.2d 804,807 (4th Cir. 1975); American
Mfg. Assocs., Inc. v. NLRB, 594 F.2d 30,36 (4th Cir. 1979).
47. See, e.g., Western Exterminator Co. v. NLRB, 565 F.2d 1114, 1118 (9th Cir. 1977);
Stephenson v. NLRB, 614 F.2d 1210, 1213 (9th Cir. 1980).
48. See. e.g.. Midwest Regional Joint Bd., Amalgamated Clothing Workers of Am. v. NLRB,
564 F.2d 434, 440 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
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52
t
Some circuits, parti-ularly the Second,4lthifd,5O Fifth,5 and Eighth,

rejcted the established nomenclature and utiliked their own causation
tests to analyze dual motive cases.
Thus, the Board in Wright Line attempted to "alleviate the confusion

which [existed] at various levels of the decisional process" regarding causality in cases alleging urilawful discrimination. 53 The effort to bring har54
mony into this area of the law met varying degrees of success.

Mt. Healthy

The NLRB, seeking guidance ahd support, grafted the causatiori test
promulgated by the Supreme Court in Mt. Healthy City School District

Board of Education v. Doyle55 onto NLRA cases. The Board believed
that this test, couched in First Amefhdment protected actMiiy and public
sector employment language, was the appropriate test for mixed-motive
56

§8(a)(3) allegations.
The Mt. Healthy case arose when Doyle, an untenured public school
teacher, filed suit against the Mt. Healthy, Ohio school board fog wrongfully refusing to renew his contract and award him tenure. The school

49, See, e.g., Waterbury Cdmmunity Antenna, Inc. v. NLRB, 587 F.2d 90,98 (2d Cir, 1978), (a
reasonable basis for inferring that the permissible ground alone would not have led to the discharge,
thus, it was partially motivated by an impermissible one). But see NLRB v. Midtown Serv. Co., 425
F.2d 665, 671 (2d Cir. 1970) (the employee "would not have been discharged butforJheranti-union
activity" where the employer supported the union in a decertification movement ,(emphasis added).
50. See, e.g., Edgewood Nursing Center v. NLRB, 581 F.2d 363, 368 (3d fir. 1978) ("MTle
employer violates the act if anti-union animus was the 'real motive' . . . or the 'real cause, ...
(citations omitted) (emphasis added). But see NLRIJ v. Eagle Material Handling, Inc., 55.8 F.2d 160,
169 (3d Cir. 1977) ("[a]n employer violates section 8(a)(3) and (i) of the Act. .. if the action is
motivated at least in part by anti-union consideratiotis.") (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
51. See, e.g., NLRB v. Aero Corp., 581 F.2d 511,514-15 (5th Cir. 1978) ("s6.bst'antial evidence
shows that the force of anti-union purpose was 'rbasonably equal' to the lawful motive prompting
conduct"). But see Syncro Corp. v. NLRB, 597 F.2d 922 (5th Cir. 1979) (based on the lack pf
substantial evidence supporting the findings, the court denied enforcement of tle Boqrd's order that
anti-union animus was the fnotivating cause of the employee's discharge).
52. See, e.g,, Singer Co. v. NLRB, 429 F.2d 172, 179 (8th Cir. 1970) ("discrimina ory treatment
of employees by their employer; motivated in whole or in part by their union o protected activities,
violates §8(a)(3) and (1) and that'[t]he mere existence of valid grounds for a discl rge is no'defense to
a charge that the discharge 'vas unlawful, unless the discharge was predicated solely on thosd grounds,
and not by a desire to discourage union activity.") (quoting NLRB v. Symons Mfg. Co., 328 F.2d
835, 837 (7th Cir. 1964) (citatidn omitted)).
53. Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. at 1083, 105 L.R.R.M. at 1170.
54. See infra notes 83-95 and accompanying text.
55. 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
56. "It is our belief that application of the Mt. Healthy test will njaiptain a substantive
consistency with existing Board precedent and accommodate the concerns expressed by critics of the
Board's past treatment of cases alleging unlawful discrimination." Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. qt1083,
105 L.R.R.M. at 1170 (footnote omitted).
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board cited two incidents for denying renewal. One incident was the
teacher's use of obscene language and gestures toward female students in
the school cafeteria. 57 The other episode consisted of Doyle's telephone
call to a local radio station, discussing the adoption of a new teacher dress
and appearance code. 58
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed, in an unpublished opinion, 59 the district court's finding that of the two reasons cited by
the school board, the first involved unprotected conduct and the
second was plainly protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 60 The
court reasoned that because protected activity (i.e., the telephone call)
played a substantial part in the school board's decision to discharge the
61
teacher, the board's refusal to renew the contract was unlawful.
The Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion, reversed the judgment
of the court of appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings. 62
The Court held that after it was shown that an improper motive entered
into the school board's decision, the school board must be afforded the
opportunity to establish that it would have reached the same decision
even if the protected activity had not occurred. 63 The Court formulated a
two-part causation test to be employed in dual-motive cases. Initially, the
burden is placed on the employee to show that "his conduct was constitutionally protected, and that this conduct was a 'substantial factor'-or,
64
... a 'motivating factor"' in the employer's decision not to rehire him.
After the employee meets that burden, the burden shifts to the employer
to demonstrate "by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have
reached the same decision ... even in the absence of the protected
65
conduct."
The NLRB, seeking to buttress its position and corral wayward
circuit courts, adopted the Mt. Healthy causation test for a §8(a)(3)
violation.
Wright Line
In Wright Line, Bernard Lamoureux filed charges with the Board
alleging that he was discharged because of his union activity, in violation

57.

Mi. HealthY, 429 U.S. at 281-82.

58. Id.
59. Doyle v. Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 529 F.2d 524 (6th Cir., 1975)
(unpublished opinion).
60. Mi. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 283 85.
61. Id. at 284-85.
62. Id. at 287.
63. Id. at 285-86.
64. Id. at 287"(citation omitted).
65. Id.
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of §8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. 66 Lamoureux, an activist in two unsuccess-

ful Teamster campaigns to organize Wright Line's employees, was a shop

inspector who was considered a "better than average employee. 6 7 The
employer asserted that Lamoureux was discharged for violating a plant

rule against "knowingly altering, or falsifying production time reports,

68
payroll records, time cards."
The Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ) found that the employer
69
had discharged Lamoureux in violation of §8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.
70
The Board affirmed the AU's decision. In a lengthy opinion, the Board
analyzed the causation tests used by the Board and by the circuits,
adopted the Mt. Healthy two-tier causation analysis test, 71 and applied it
to dual motivation cases arising under the NLRA. 72 The Board found
that a §8(a)(3) and (1) violation had occurred because: the General

73 showing that Lamoureux's union activCounsel had made aprimafacie
74

ity was a motivating factor in the employer's decision to discharge him,
and the employer had failed to demonstrate that it would have taken the
75
same action against Lamoureux in the absence of his union activities.
This rule adequately resolved the fact pattern presented in Wright
Line. However, the Board's use of a "shifting burden of proof"76 standard
was highlighted and criticized by the First Circuit when it was called upon

66. Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. at 1083,1092,105 L.R.R.M. at 1169,1175.
67. Id. at 1090, 105 L.R.R.M. at 1175.
68. Id. at 1089, 1094, 105 L.R.R.M. at 1175. Specifically, Lamoureux submitted inaccurate
records of the times at which he made inspections. Forte, Lamoureux's immediate supervisor, was
told by the plant superintendent to "check" on Lamoureux. Id. at 1090, 1093, 105 L.R.R.M. at 1175.
Forte, upon examining Lamoureux's timesheet, discovered that Lamoureux recorded times at which
he was working on certain jobs at the identical times when Forte had been unable to find him at his
work station. Id. at 1090, 1094, 105 L.R.R.M. at 1175. Management officials concede that
Lamoureux "was not discharged for being away from his work station or for not performing his
assigned work," Id. at 1090, 105 L.R.R.M. at 1175 (footnote omitted), but for violating the plant rule.
Id. at 1089, 1094, 105 L.R.R.M. at 1175.
69. Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. at 1083,1098,105 L.R.R.M. at 1169,1175.
70. Id. at 1083, 105 L.R.R.M. at 1169.
71. See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
72. Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. at 1083, 1088-89, 105 L.R.R.M. at 1169, 1174-75. Substantive criticisms of this causation analysis are addressed infra at notes 158-220 and accompanying text.
73. A "primafacieshowing creates a kind of presumption that an unfair labor practice has
been committed," Wright Line, 662 F.2d at 905, "and can be overcome only by a preponderance of
competent, credible rebutting evidence." National Auto. and Casualty Ins. Co., 199 N.L.R.B. 91,92,
81 L.R.R.M. 1183, 1184 (1972).
74. Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. at 1090, 105 L.R.R.M. at 1176. The Board's conclusion is based
on evidence of the employer's anti-union animus directed toward Lamoureux because of his active
role in union campaigns, and the timing of the discharge, which occurred shortly after the latest union
election.
75. Id. at 1091, 105 L.R.R.M. at 1176 (citation omitted).
76. See supranote 24 and accompanying text.
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to enforce the Board's order. 77 The court upheld the Board's ultimate
decision, 78 but focused on and subsequently rejected the Board's newly
formulated causation standard. 79 In lieu of the Board's standard, the First
Circuit proposed that "once the [G]eneral [C]ounsel has established a

basis for finding an improper motive, the employer must merely, 'come
forwardwith enough evidence to convince the trier of fact that... there
is no longer a preponderance of evidence establishing a violation'".80 Once
the General Counsel establishes a primafacie showing of an employer's
improper motive, the employer has the burden of "production," rather
than "persuasion," 8' to rebut or meet the General Counsel's primafacie
case. The burden of persuading the trier of fact that the discharge would

not have taken place "but for" the protected activity "remains always with
82

the [G]eneral [C]ounsel."
The First Circuit's opinion, rejecting the Board's analysis, added to

the confusion of causation analysis in dual motive cases. A polarization of
the circuit courts resulted. The First, 83 Second, 84 and Third 85 Circuits
opposed the Board's Wright Line standard, and the Fourth 86 and District
of Columbia 87 Circuits implicitly rejected that standard. On the other

hand, the Fifth,88 Sixth,89 Eighth, 90 and Ninth9 l Circuits embraced the
Board's burden-shifting analysis. The Seventh Circuit had conflicting

77. NLRB v. Wright Line, A Division of Wright Line, Inc., 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 989 (1982).
78. "[W]e find substantial evidence to support a conclusion by the Board, on the preponderance of the evidence, that Lamoureux was discharged because of his union activity." Id. at 907.
79. "[H]owever, we disagree with the Board on the narrow issue of defining the exact nature of
the burden which the employer thus acquires." Id. at 904. See supranote 24 and accompanying text.
80. Id. at 904 (Quoting NLRB v. Amber Delivery Serv., 651 F.2d 57, 69 (lst Cir. 1981)
(emphasis added); NLRB v. Cable Vision, 660 F.2d 1, 8 (Ist Cir. 1981)).
81. See infra notes 183-207 and accompanying text.
82. Wright Line, 662 F.2d at 906-07.
83. See, e.g., id. at 899; NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp. 674 F.2d 130 (Ist Cir.
1982).
84. See, e.g., NLRB v. New York Univ. Medical Center, 702 F.2d 284 (2d Cir. 1983).
85. See, e.g., Behring Int'l, Inc. v. NLRB, 675 F.2d 83 (3d Cir. 1982); NLRB v. Blackstone,
Inc., 685 F.2d 102 (3d Cir. 1982).
86. See, e.g., Burlington Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 680 F.2d 974 (4th Cir. 1982) (applying the
"dominant motive" standard); Standard-Coosa-Thatcher Carpet Yam Div., Inc. v. NLRB, 691 F.2d
1133 (4th Cir. 1982) (applying the "but for" standard).
87. See. e.g., Midwest Regional Joint Bd., Amalgamated Clothing Workers of Am. v. NLRB,
564 F.2d 434 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (a pre-Wright Line case).
88. See, e.g., Red Ball Motor Freight, Inc. v. NLRB, 660 F.2d 626 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
456 U.S. 997 (1982).
89. See, e.g., Borel Restaurant Corp. v. NLRB, 676 F.2d 190 (6th Cir. 1982).
90. See, e.g., NLRB v. Senftner Volkswagen Corp., 681 F.2d 557 (8th Cir. 1982).
91. See, e.g., Zurn Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 680 F.2d 683 (9th Cir. 1982).
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views 92 and the Tenth 93 and Eleventh 94 Circuits remained undecided.
Thus, the conflict among the courts of appeal necessitated Supreme
Court review of the burden allocation issue in NLRB v. Transportation
Management Corporation.95
TRANSPORTATION MANAGEMENT

The Board
Sam Santillo was a special education bus driver for the Transportation Management Corporation located in Springfield, Massachusetts. In
mid-March, 1979, Santillo and a fellow employee spoke to officials of the
Teamsters Union about organizing the drivers at Transportation Manage96
ment.
After the meeting with Teamster officials, Santillo returned to work
and spoke with other drivers who were interested in supporting the
Union. 97 He distributed authorization, cards and obtained seven signed
98
cards from the employees.
Four days after Santillo met with Teamster officials, George Patterson, Santillo's supervisor, spoke with Joseph Baer, a driver and mechanic
at Transportation Management. 99 Patterson told Baer that he (Patterson)
heard that Santillo had "started the Union,"100 that Santillo was "twofaced," and that "he [Patterson] was going to get even with Santillo." 101
92. See. e.g., NLRB v. Webb Ford, Inc., 689 F.2d 733 (7th Cir. 1982) (adopting the First
Circuit's analysis). But cf. NLRB v. Town & Country L.P. Gas Serv. Co., 687 F.2d 187 (7th Cir.
1982) (adopting the Board's analysis).
93. See, e.g., NLRB v. Carbonex Coal Co., 679 F.2d 200, 203 (10th Cir. 1982) ('Whether
Wright Line cleared up a gray area, or, on the contrary, compounded the entire problem, is
debatable").
94. See, e.g., NLRB v. Lummus Indus., Inc., 679 F.2d 229,233, n.6 (I lth Cir. 1982) ("We note
in passing that this is not a 'mixed-motive' discharge case, and therefore we are not required to
analyze the application of Wright Line..... ") (citation omitted).
95. .._U.S.103 S. Ct. 2469 (1983). The Supreme Court had previously refused to rule on
this issue. See Wright Line, 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 989 (1982); Red Ball
Motor Freight, Inc. v. NLRB, 660 F.2d 626 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 997 (1982);
Pettibone Corp. v. NLRB, 679 F.2d 894. (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, U.S. _
103 S.Ct. 61
(1982).
96. Transportation Management Corp., 256 N.L.R.B. 101, 103, 107 L.R.R.M. 1170, 1171
(1981).
97. Id. at 103, 107 L.R.R.M. at 1171.
98. Id.
99. The night before in a local restaurant, Patterson asked Baer if he had heard anything about
the union. Baer replied that he had not. Id.
100. Id. at 103, 107, 107 L.R.R.M. at 1171.
101. Id.The Administrative Law Judge held, and the Board affirmed, that these conversations
between Patterson and Baer "constitute unlawful threats of reprisal as well as create the impression of
surveillance of employee's union activities" in violation of §8(a)(l) of the Act. Id. at 107, 107
L.R.R.M. at 1171-72 (citing Goodyear Aerospace Corp., 234 N.L.R.B. 539, 97 L.R.R.M. 1322
(1978)).
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On the same evening, Patterson 'spoke with Ed West, a driver at Transportation Managein'nt and Sdntillo's brother-in-law, about Santillo's
union activity. 02 buring this conversation, Patterson said that he took
Santillo's actions personally and that he Would remember Santillo's
actions when Santillo asked for a favor. 103
Soon thereafter, a union meeting was scheduled at the local union
hall. That morning, union officials were outside the employer's premises
distributing leaflets "announcing the union meeting to be held that evening,"' 04 Santillo stopped and briefly spoke to the union representatives
outside Transportation Management. 05 Later that same day, Santillo
was discharged. Patterson informed Santillo that he was being fired for
06
"leaving his keys in the bus, and taking unauthorized breaks."
Santillo filed charges with the Board and the Regional Director
issued a complaint against Transportation Management alleging that it
discharged Santillo in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. The
Administrattive Law Judge found, 07 and the Board affirmed, 08 that Santillo's dischatge was, in fact, violative of the Act.
At trial, the General Counsel established a prima facie case: the
employee was engaged in union activity; 09 evidence clearly established
the employer's knowledge of the employee's union activity;" 0 the employer
demonstfated a strolg antiunion animus;I' and, the employee's discharge
came tht day efter the employer threatened to "get even" with the
employee.1 2 The burden then shifted to the employer to demonsfrate that
Santillo would have been discharged "without regard to these considerations."113

102. Id. at 103, 107 L.R.R.M. at 1171.
103. Id. Santillo telephoned Patterson the following day and spoke with Patterson at
Transportation Management. Santillo told Patterson "not to take it personally" and added that the
dispute "was really between the Union and Transportation Management Corporation." Id.
104. Id. at 104, 107 L.R.R.M. at 1171.
105. Id. "There is no evidence in the record that any management officials saw Santillo
speaking with these union officials. Patterson admits that he saw the union officials distributing
leaflets on that day and that he read them and was therefore aware that a union meeting was
scheduled to be held that evening." Id.
106. Id. The unauthorized breaks fell into two categories: "stealing time" by taking
unauthorized coffee breaks and "stealing time" by stopping off at home before reporting back to the
garage. Id. at 101, 105, 107 L.R.R.M. at 1171.
107. Id. at 101, 109, 107 L.R.R.M. at 1171-72.
108. Id. at 101, 102, 107 L.R.R.M. at 1171-72.
109. Id. at 108, 107 L.R.R.M. at 1171.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 101, 108, 107 L.R.R.M. at 1171.
113. Id. at 101, 107 L.R.R.M. at 1171.
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The Employer cited three reasons necessitating Santillo's discharge: 114
leaving his keys in his bus; taking unauthorized coffee breaks; and stopping off at home. However, the Board found that although Santillo had
left his keys in his bus on the day of his termination, a dischargeable
offense, it was common practice for the drivers to do so. 115 The Board
dismissed the infraction as "nothing more than a purely pretextual reason
which does more to detract from the lawfulness of the discharge than to
support it. "116
The Board also rejected Transportation Management's contention
that Santillo's unauthorized coffee breaks were a dischargeable offense.
Santillo concedes taking these breaks, but not only was this "a normal
practice among the drivers," 117 but "[i]n no such instance is there any
evidence of disciplinary action being taken, much less any suspension or
8
discharge.""
Finally, Santillo's unauthorized stops at home were discredited by
the Board as evidence of a dischargeable act.' 9 The Board confirmed that
Santillo did take these breaks, but he was never confronted nor warned of
possible consequences.120 Santillo's summary discharge did not comport
with the employer's regular procedure of three written warnings before
21
discharge.
The Board applied the controversial Wright Line test'22 and concluded that the employer failed to "meet its burden of overcoming the
General Counsel'sprimafacie case by establishing by competent evidence
that Santillo would have been discharged even absent his union activities."123
The Circuit Court
The Board sought enforcement of its order' 24 in the Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit. 2 5 The court, a vocal critic of the Wright

114. Id at 101, 104-05, 107 L.R.R.M. at 1171; see also supra note 106.
115. Id at 101, 107 L.R.R.M. at 1171.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 101-02,107 L.R.R.M. at 1171.
121. Id.at 102, 107 L.R.R.M. at 1171.
122. Id at 101, 107 L.R.R.M. at 1171; see also supranote 24 and accompanying text.
123. Id. at 102, 107 L.R.R.M. at 1171.
124. Id. at 102, 109-10, 107 L.R.R.M. at 1171. Transportation Management was ordered to
cease and desist from engaging in §8(a)(1) and (3) unfair labor practices and, to reinstate Santillo to
his former position.
125. NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., 674 F.2d 130 (1st Cir. 1982).
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Line test, denied enforcement of the Board's order 126 although it found
that there was sufficient evidence to conclude that "Patterson's threats
were union-oriented, gave an impression of surveillance, and constituted
unlawful coercion"12 7 in violation of §8(a)(1) of the Act. Expressing its
disdain for Wright Line, the court reiterated 2 8 that it would reject "any
effort by the Board to impose a greater burden" of proof1 29 upon the
employer as "outside the Board's statutory authority." 30 The court
3
remanded the case to the Board for reconsideration.1 '
The Supreme Court
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari 3 2 in Transportation Management, thereby ending years of speculation and confusion
among the Circuit Courts of Appeal and the Board with regard to
§8(a)(3) causation analysis. In a somewhat cryptic opinion, the Court
reversed the First Circuit and held that the burden of proof placed on the
employer under the Board's Wright Line decision is both reasonable and
133
consistent with §§8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act.
After a lengthy review of the facts, Justice White, writing for a
unanimous Court, focused on the early case history interpreting the Act
and §8(a)(3) violations. The court cited several pre-1940 Board decisionsl34 and concluded that the Board has consistently adhered to the
notion that "to establish an unfair labor practice the General Counsel
need show by a preponderance of the evidence only that a discharge is in
any way motivated by a desire to frustrate union activity." 35 If an

126. Id. at 132.
127. Id. at 131 (citations omitted).
128. See NLRB v. Wright Line, A Division of Wright Line. Inc. 662 F.2d 899 (Ist Cir. 1981);
NLRB v. Amber Delivery Serv., 651 F.2d 57 (Ist
Cir. 1981); NLRB v. Cable Vision, 660 F.2nd I(Ist
Cir. 1981).
129. Namely, a burden greater than "neutralizing the implication of sufficient anti-union
motive arising from the General Counsel'sprimafacie case." TransportationManagement, 674 F.2d
at 131 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
130. Id.
131. Id. at 131-32.
132. NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., ... U.S____ 103 S.Ct. 372 (1982).
133. NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., ..._U
103 S.Ct. 2469 (1983).
134 The Court cited Consumers Research, Inc., 2 N.L.R.B. 57, 73, 1 L.R.R.M. 23, 457,
461-62 (1936); Louisville Refining Co., 4 N.L.R.B. 844, 861, I-A L.R.R.M. 403, 407-08 (1938),
enforced, 102 F.2d 678 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 568 (1939); Dow Chem. Co., 13 N.L.R.B.
933. 1023, 4 L.R.R.M. 373, 374-75 (1939), enforced in part, 117 F.2d 455 (6th Cir. 1941); and
Republic Creosoting Co., 19 N.L.R.B. 267, 294, 5 L.R.R.M. 497, 499-501 (1940), for the proposition
that "it was an unfair labor practice for an employer to discharge a worker where anti-union animus
actually contributedto the discharge decision." TransportationManagement, -U.S._., 103 S.Ct.
at 2472 (emphasis added).
135. Id. at _
103 S.Ct. at 2473.
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employer possesses and exhibits an anti union animus, the employer
would nevertheless be innocent of a §8(a)(3) and (1)136 violation by proving that he would have taken the same action for "wholly permissible
reasons." 37 The Court concluded that Wright Line was merely the
Board's attempt to restate its analysis in verbiage "more acceptable to the
Courts of Appeals."1 38 Thus, the Board's position was clarified: "proof
that the discharge would have occurred in any event and for valid reasons
carried the
amounted to an affirmative defense on which the employer
139
evidence."
the
of
preponderance
a
by
burden of proof
The Supreme Court then addressed the elements and proof of an
unfair labor practice. Throughout the adjudication of an alleged unfair
labor practice, the General Counsel carries the burden of proving the
elements of the unfair labor practice charge. 140 Under Wright Line, the
employer is given the opportunity to prove his innocence by showing that
his actions would have been the same regardless of his improper motive:
the so-called affirmative defense. Here, the Court held that the Board's
creation of an affirmative defense "does not change or add to the elements
of the unfair labor practice that the General Counsel has the burden of
proving under §10(c)."' 4 1 The Court did not cite any Board or lower court
opinion in support of this proposition. Instead, the Court relied on the
legislative history of the Act which it conceded is silent on the subject of
mixed-motive cases.142 The Yustices acknowledged that the Board could
have construed the Act in th6 manner requested by the court of
appeals. 143 The Court, however, deferring to the Board's expertise, condoned the Board's designation of an affirmative defense that the employer
has the burden of sustaining. 144
136. Section 8(a)(l) makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to "interfere with,
restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7." 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a)(1) (1976). This broad prohibition on employer interference is violated whenever an employer
commits any of the other employer unfair labor practices. Thus, a violation of §8(a)(2) (domiiiation
or illegal assistance and support of a labor organization), §8(a)(3) (discrimination against employees
for membership in a labor organization), §8(a)(4) (discrimination against employees for Board-related
activity), or §8(a)(5) (employer's refusal to bargain in good faith) also violates §8(a)(1). These unfair
labor practices are commonly referred to as derivative violations of §8(a)(1).
137. TransportationManagement, .... U.S.__..., 103 S.Ct. at'2473 (citations and footnote
omitted).
138. Id. at _ 103 S.Ct. at 2473.
139. Id.
140. See Administrative Procedure Act §7(c), 5 U.S.C. §556(d) (1982). See also N.L.R.A.
§10(b), 29 U.S.C. §160(b) (1976); FED. R. EVID. 301. See also infra notes 147-53 and accompanying
text (discussing the application of these rules and statutes).
103 S.Ct. at 2474 (footnote omitted).
141. TransportationManagement, -U.S.142. Id at ., 103 S.Ct. at 2474 n.6. See supra note 19.
143. Id. at - 103 S.Ct. at 2474.
144. "[Tihe Board's construction here, while it may not be required by the Act, is at least
permissible under it. . ., and in these circumstances its position is entitled to deference," Id. at
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The opinion next analyzed the shifting burden of proof set out in
Wright Line. The Court depicted the Board's allocation of the burden of
proof as "clearly reasonable." 45 The Court stated that the employer is a
wrongdoer and, as such, should "bear the risk that the influence of legal
and illegal motives cannot be separated."146 Transportation Management
posited that placing the burden of persuasion on the employer contra147
venes §10(b) of the Act and §7(c) of the Administrative Procedure Act.
Section 10(b) provides that the Federal Rules of Evidence are applicable
to Board proceedings, 48 and Federal Rule 301 requires that the burden of
persuasion rests on the General Counsel. 49 Section 7(c) of the Administrative Procedure Act 150 provides that the proponent of an order retains
the burden of proof.'5' The Court's interpretation of Rule 301 and §7(c)
dissolves this position. The Court held that Rule 301 "in no way restricts
the authority of a court or an agency to change the customary burdens of
persuasion in a manner that otherwise would be permissible."1 52 The
Court added that §7(c) "determines only the burden of going forward,
53
not the burden of persuasion."
Justice White's opinion continued with a brief discussion of Mt.
Heailthy 54 and affirmed its burden allocation scheme, "which the Board
heavily relied on and borrowed from in its Wright Line decision." 155 The

103 S. Ct. at 2475 (quoting NLRB v. Weingarten, Inc. 420 U.S. 251 (1975) (the Board permissably
construed §7 to include the employee's right to have a union representative present at an investigatory
interview by the employer); NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221 (1963) (the Board properly
ruled that "super-seniority" was an unfair labor practice)).
145. Id. at 103 S.Ct. at 2475. See NLRB v. Remington Rand, Inc., 94 F.2d 862 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 304 U.S. 576 (1938).
146. Id. at .-, 103 S.Ct. at 2475.
147. Id. at __
103 S.Ct. at 2475 n.7. See supra note 140. See also infra notes 148-50
(referring to text of relevant rules and statutes).
148. Section 10(b) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. §160(b) (1976), provides, in relevant part: "Any such
proceeding shall,. . ., be conducted in accordance with the rules of evidence applicable in the district
courts of the United States...."
149. Rule 301 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides:
In all civil actions and proceedings not otherwise provided for by Act of Congress or by
these rules, a presumption imposes on the party against whom it is directed the burden of
going forward with evidence to rebut or meet the presumption, but does not shift to such
party the burden of proof in the sense of the risk of nonpersuasion, which remains
throughout the trial upon the party on whom it was originally cast.
150. Section 7(c) of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §556(d) (1982), provides, in
relevant part: "the proponent of a rule or order has the burden of proof."
151. The General Counsel is the party required to substantiate the unfair labor practice claim,
and, characterized as such, retains the burden of proving that claim.
152. TransportationManagement, ...... U.S. at _
103 S.Ct. at 2475 n.7.
153. Id. (citations omitted).
154. Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. 274 (1977). See supra notes 55-65 and accompanying text.
155. TransportationManagement,
U.S. at _ 103 S.Ct. at 2475.
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Court simply noted that the analogy to Mt. Healthy "drawn by the Board
[in Wright Line and utilized in Transportation Management] was a fair
one." 156
The Court reversed the First Circuit, concluding that the Court of
Appeals "erred in refusing to enforce the Board's orders which rested on
the Board's Wright Line decision." 5 7 Hence, the Wright Line causation
analysis now controls §8(a)(3) litigation.
WRIGHT LINE/TRANSPORTATION MANAGEMENT: CRITICISMS

The Wright Line causation analysis is one theoretical framework in
which an alleged §8(a)(3) violation may be investigated. However, despite
the unanimity of the Supreme Court's decision, the analysis and its sanctioning in TransportationManagement are flawed.
Constitutionalv. Statutory Application:
The First Amendment and the NLRA
There is both a legal and a factual distinction differentiating causation analysis employed in a constitutional or labor context. The Board, in
Wright Line, adopted a legal causation test tailored to protect First
Amendment activity and insure adherence to the equal protection clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. 158 The Mt. Healthy/ Wright Line test
adequately protects these fundamental rights, 59 however, an inherent
difference exists between Constitutional and statutory rights. The rights
conferred by the Constitution should be afforded the highest degree of
protection by the government. Free speech and the guarantee of a free
press are qualitatively superior to §7 fights under the NLRA 160 or any
similar statutory right. 161

156. Id. at __ 103 S.Ct. at 2475 (footnote omitted).
157. Id.
158. See supra notes 55-65 and accompanying text (referring to Mi. Healthy).
159. Fundamental rights are those principles of constitutional law deemed essential and which
have their origin in the express or implied terms of the Constitution. BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 149,
607 (rev. 5th ed. 1979). The Supreme Court has utilized this causation test in cases involving the first
and sixth amendments, the equal protection clause, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Although the latter deals with statutory rights, these rights are closely associated with constitutional
rights and privileges. See Note, Wright Line: The NLRB Adopts the Mt. Healthy Test for Dual
Motive DischargeCases Under the LMRA, 32 MERCER L. REV. 933,939-40 (1981); Remar, Climbing Mt. Healthy: In Search of the "Wright Line" on Mixed-Motive Discharges Under Section
8(a)(3), 4 INDUs. REL L.J. 636, 660 (1981).
160. 29 U.S.C. §157 (1976). Section 7 provides: "Employees shall have the right to selforganization, to form, join or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all
of such activities .... "
161. See infra note 159.
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This logic does not necessitate the conclusion that rights conferred
by the Act are trivial. Congress expressed its desire to balance the competing interests in the labor setting by enacting the NLRA and its subsequent
amendments.162 These laws establish rights augmenting the position of the
employee against the clearly recognized superior position of the em63
ployer.
The balance struck by the Court in Mt. Healthy,164 in a constitutional setting, is similar to that struck by Congress in the NLRA in a
labor setting. 165 Despite the similarities, the test used in First Amendment
cases may not be appropriate in the labor context. 66 Even the Board
concedes that Mt. Healthy "does not constitute a construction of the
NLRA" and therefore is not controlling in §8(a)(3) disputes. 67 The Board
was not alone in questioning the applicability of Mt. Healthy on the
68

Act.1

In TransportationManagement, the Supreme Court acknowledged
that the Board "heavily relied on and borrowed from" 169 a case "implicating the Constitution" 7 0 in its Wright Line decision. Yet, the Court
depicted the allocation of the burden of proof merely as "prudent"17' and
added that the "analogy to Mount Healthy drawn by the Board was a fair

162. See NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 229 (1963) ("weighing the interests of
employees in concerted activity against the interest of the employer in operating his business"),
163. See American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 310, 316-18 (1965) (labor laws
attempt to redress the imbalance of economic power between labor and management).
164. See supranotes 55-65 and accompanying text.
165. Federal-Mogul Corp. v. NLRB, 566 F.2d 1245, 1265 (5th Cir. 1978) (Thornberry, J.,
concurring) (denying enforcement of a Board order finding coercive interrogation and surveillance of
employees).
166. Id. See also infra notes 158-78 and accompanying text. But see Note, Wright Line: The
NLRB Adopts the Mt. Healthy Test for Dual Motive Discharge Cases Under the LMRA, 32
MERCER L. REv. 933, 940; Du Ross, Toward Rationality in DiscriminatoryDischarge Cases: The
Impact of Mt. Healthy Board of Education v. Doyle Upon the NLRA, 66 GEo. L.J. 1109, 1115-16,
1121-22 (1978) ("[i]f sufficient protection for paramount constitutional rights results from a dominant motive [i.e., Mt. Healthy] test, a similar standard should adequately protect subordinate
statutory rights.") (citations omitted).
167. Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. at 1083 n.3,105 L.R.R.M. at 1170 n.3.
168. The Second Circuit, in Waterbury Community Antenna, Inc. v. NLRB, 587 F.2d 90,99
(2d Cir. 1978), noted that Mt. Healthy is a first amendment case and questioned "whether a test
which is adequate to protect [F]irst [A]mendment rights would prove inadequate to protect organizational rights" under the Act. Mt. Healthy deals with two topics: public sector employment and first
amendment activity - neither of which are immediate concerns of §8(a)(3). The Supreme Court also
disposed of issues regarding jurisdiction and sovereign immunity. But see Remar, supranote 159, at
663-64 (Second Circuit's erroneous application of law and methodology).
169. TransportationManagement, -U.S. at -, 103 S.Ct. at 2475.
170. Id at ., 103 S.Ct. at 2475.
171. Id
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one." 72 The Court cited the Administrative Procedure Act'73 and the
Federal Rules of Evidence 74 as support for its position. The Court never
addressed the ramifications of a Constitutional/statutory dichotomy.
A factual distinction also exists between First Amendment and
NLRA cases. In Mt: Healthy, the employer admitted that he fired the
employee for activity which was later found to be protected under the
First Amendment. 75 The employer's claim "was thus a true affirmative
defense which went to the appropriateness of the remedy ... rather than
to the existence of a violation."176 In the conventional labor case, as
illustrated in TransportationManagement, the employer and employee
dispute the reason or reasons for the discharge.177 Thus, a test which shifts
the burden of proof onto the employer to establish an affirmative defense
would not be effective in deciding the ultimate issue of "whether or not an
unfair labor practice has actually occurred-i.e., for deciding if the
determining motive of the discharge was anti-union animus or some valid
178
business reason."
Burden of Proof
The process of establishing a §8(a)(3) violation should be clear and
precise. The burden of proof is on the moving party, i.e., the General
Counsel, and the requisite quantum of proof is the familiar "preponderance of the testimony [evidence]" standard. 179 The Mt. Healthy! Wright
Line/TransportationManagement causation test shifts this burden from
one party to the other. 80 The net result is a "shell game" leaving the
litigants, as well as the courts, in a quandary as to which party has what
burden and when. The Supreme Court legally resolved the issue by
endorsing the Wright Line test in TransportationManagement. 81 However, as a practical matter, it is difficult for the courts and the parties to
reconcile and use this burden shifting analysis. 182

172. Id.(footnote omitted).
173. Id at -, 103 S.Ct. at 2475 n.7. See infra note 150.
174. Id.See infra note 149.
175. Mt. Healthy,429 U.S. at 282-84.
176. -Wright Line, 662 F.2d at 906.
177. See id See also infra note 13 and accompanying text.
178. Wright Line, 662 F.2d at 906.
179. 29 U.S.C. §160(c) (1976). Section 10(c) provides, in pertinent part: "upon the preponderance of the testimony taken."

180. See infra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
181. See infra notes 31, 157 and accompanying text.
182. See Lederer, "W'right Line or Spur Track?, 33 LAB L.J. 67, 76 (1982): "Under the
Board's Wright Line formula, it is difficult to see how the employer could assume an affirmative
defense burden without also having to carry the ultimate burden of persuasion - normally assumed
throughout by the General Counsel."
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Evidentiary rules provide for two separate burdens of proof. the
burden of production, i.e., the burden of "going forward" to produce
evidence; and the burden of persuasion, i.e., the ultimate burden of "persuading the trier of fact that the alleged fact is true.' 83 The Wright Line
causation test requires the General Counsel to make a primafacieshowing that the Act was violated, and then the burden shifts to the employer
to show that it would have discharged the employee anyway. 184 In the
absence of more explicit language, it appears that this shifting burden is
the burden of persuasion. 85
The commentators of evidentiary law reject this concept. Professor
McCormick states that the burden of persuasion "does not shift from
party to party... because it need not be allocated until it is time for a
decision. When the time for a decision comes, 186... if the party having
the burden of persuasion has failed to satisfy that burden, the issue is to
87
be decided against him."
Professor Wigmore differentiates between the rebuttal of a prima
facie case and the ultimate burden of persuasion. "[A] "primafacie'case
...

need not be overcome by a preponderance of the evidence, or by

evidence of greater weight; but the evidence needs only to be balanced,
put in equipoise, by some evidence worthy of credence; and if this be
done, the burden of the evidence has been met.... 1 188 The Federal Rules
of Evidence' 89 and the Administrative Procedure Act,190 both applicable
to NLRA litigation, are in accord. Additionally, the Board's own rules
and regulations provide that the General Counsel has the burden of proof
in §8 violations. 191
The First Circuit, in Wright Line, concluded that the "employer in a
section 8(a)(3) discharge case has no more than the limited duty of pro183.

C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 783-84 (2d ed. 1972) (footnote

omitted).
184. See infra note 24 and accompanying text.
185. See Wright Line, 662 F.2d at 905; see also TransportationManagement, .U,S.
at.__,
103 S.Ct. at 2475 (citing NLRB v. Remington Rand, Inc., 94 F.2d 862, 872 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 304
U.S. 576 (1938), ". . . a case on which the Board relied when it began taking the position that the
burden of persuasion could be shifted.").
186. Namely, when both parties have sustained their respective burdens of production and all
evidence has been introduced.
187. MCCORMICK, infra note 183, at 784.
188. 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §2487 at 296-97 (Chadbourn rev. 1981) (quoting Speas v. Merchants'Bank & Trust Co., 188 N.C. 524, 529, 125 S.E. 398, 401 (1924)).
189. FED. R. EvID. 301. See infra note 149. See also 29 C.F.R. §101.10(a) (1983). Section
101.10(a) provides, in part: "The rules of evidence applicable in the district courts of the United States
...are, so far as practicable, controlling" in Board hearings.
190. 5 U.S.C. §556(d) (1982). See supra note 150.
191. 29 C.F.R. §101.10(b) (1983). Section 101.10(b) provides, in part: "The Board's attorney
has the burden of proof of violations of section 8" of the Act.
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ducing evidence to balance, not to outweigh, the evidence produced by
the [G]eneral [C]ounsel."192 This position was rejected by the Board and
dismissed by the Supreme Court in TransportationManagement.
In TransportationManagement, the Supreme Court bifurcated the
burden of persuasion. The first burden dealt with the threshold question
of whether the employer fired the employee, at least in part, because he
engaged in protected activities;' 93 the second with the Board-created
affirmative defense. 194 The former must be sustained by the General
Counsel and the latter by the employer. 95 Although the Board insisted
that this affirmative defense "does not shift the ultimate burden," 196 this
theory is inconsistent with evidentiary law, the Federal Rules of Evidence
197
and Board procedure.
The Board, in Wright Line, pointed to NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers 98 as an implicit sanction for the burden shifting of Wright Line.
Wright Line did not quote any rule or language from Great Dane mandating the shift of the burden of persuasion.' 99 The Supreme Court in
Great Dane held, inter alia, that certain employer conduct which is
"inherently destructive" of employee statutory rights may violate §8(a)(3)
absent proof of an anti-union animus or unlawful motivation. On the
other hand, when employer conduct causes "comparatively slight" harm
to employee rights, the court would require proof of unlawful motivation. 200 The Great Dane approach determined that "once it has been
proved that the employer engaged in discriminatory conduct .. ., the
burden is upon the employer to establish that he was motivated by legitimate objectives since proof of motivation is most accessible to him."2 0'
Although Great Dane apparently shifted some portion of the burden
of proof onto the employer, the extent of this shifting and the scope of the

192. Wright Line, 662 F.2d at 905. See also NLRB v. Amber Delivery Serv., Inc., 651 F.2d 57,
69 (1st Cir. 1981) ("[tlhis shift [referring to the burden of proof] does not impose an overall burden
upon Amber [the employer] of proving itself 'innocent' of violating the statute. Rather, Amber must
simply comeforwardwith enough evidence to convince the trier of fact that,. . .there is no longer a
preponderance of evidence establishing a violation." (emphasis added)). The burden of goingforward
and producing evidence requires a party to meet or rebut the primafacie case, not necessarily to
overcome it.
193. TransportationManagement, -U.S. at _ 103 S.Ct. at 2473 n.5.
194. Id. at .... , 103 S.Ct. at 2473 (quoting Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. at 1084 n.5, 1088 n.11,
105 L.R.R.M. at I170n.5, 1174 n.ll).
195. Id. at.,
103 S.Ct. at2474-75.
196. Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. at 1088 n.1 1, 105 L.R.R.M. at 1174 n.] 1.
197. See infra notes 183-92 and accompanying text.
198. 388 U.S. 26 (1967).
199. See Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. at 1088, 105 L.R.R.M. at 1174.
200. Great Dane, 388 U.S. at 34.
201. Id.
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burden is unclear. 202 A reasonable interpretation of the language indicates
that Great Dane established the parameters of the burden of production
for the employer and is not a directive by the Court ordering a shift in the
ultimate burden of persuasion. Furthermore, Great Dane may not be
relevant to the fact pattern of Wright Line or TransportationManagement where a single discharge, as opposed to an overall policy of the
203
employer, was questioned.
The Board also relied on the Act's legislative history in upholding its
Wright Line decision. In Wright Line, the Board cited a statement made
by Senator Taft explaining the 1947 amendments to the Act. 204 Senator
Taft's quote revealed that the original House version of the amendment
"put the entire burden on the employee to show he was not discharged for
cause. [However][,] [u]nder provision of the [adopted] conference report,
2 05
the employer has to make the proof.
A thorough reading of Taft's comments casts doubt on the Board's
conclusion that the remark bolsters its position sanctioning the shifting
burden of proof. Taft continued: "[T]he Board will have to determineand it always has-whether the discharge [under §8(a)(3)] was for cause
or for union activity, and the preponderance of the evidence will determine that question."206 Senator Taft's comments, taken as a whole, are
inconclusive as to whether Congress intended to shift the burden of proof
207
from the General Counsel to the employer.
Deferral to the Board
Assuming arguendo that TransportationManagement is the proper
legal analysis employed in §8(a)(3) violations, on what rationale is it
based? The most compelling rationale is the Court's deferral to agency

202. See supra note 201 and accompanying text. See also Remar, supra note 159, at 661
("[a]lthough Great Dane clearly shifts some burden of proof onto the employer, the exact nature of
that burden is obscure.").
203. See Wright Line, 662 F.2d 899, 904 n.8 (1st Cir. 1981) (referring to Great Dane).
204. Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. at 1088,105 L.R.R.M. at 1174; 93 CONG. REc. 6519 (1947),
reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACr, 1947, at 1595

(1974). See 29 U.S.C. §160(c) (1976). Section 10(c) of the Act provides in part: "No order of the
Board shall require the reinstatement of any individual as an employee who has been suspended or
discharged.... ifsuch individual was suspended or discharged for cause."
205. Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. at 1088,105 L.R.R.M. at 1174; 93 CONG. REc. 6519 (1947),
reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 204, at 1595.
206. 93 CONG. REC. 6519 (1947), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 204, at 1595.
207. Senators Taft and Pepper debated the proper burden of proof which the employer must
sustain to avoid Board-ordered reinstatement of the discharged employee under §10(c). The debate
was limited to a discussion of reinstatement as an appropriate remedy once a violation was established. The discussion did not address the issue of burden allocation between the employer and the
General Counsel in §8(a)(3) litigation. 93 CONG. REc. 6518-19 (1947). See also Lederer, supra note
182, at 74.
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expertise. 208 The Supreme Court stated that "'the Board's construction
here, while it may not be required by the Act, is at least permissible under
2 09
it. . .,' and in these circumstances its position is entitled to deference."
Deferral to agency expertise is a settled rule of law applicable to
labor cases arising under the Act. The Supreme Court has stated that
decisions by the Board should be accorded considerable deference 210 and

has designated the "substantial evidence test" as the standard for judicial
review of Board decisions. 21 The policy of judicial deference to the
Board's findings is codified in §10(e) of the Act.2 12 Section 10(e) provides
that the courts have the primary responsibility for determining questions
of law related to the agency's undertakings. 2 3 Thus, the reviewing court
must defer to the Board's findings of fact if supported by substantial
evidence. 21 4 However, a court may affirm the Board's legal analysis, but it
is not requiredto adopt the Board's legal causation test under the rubric
of the substantial evidence standard. The mere fact that the Board found
this burden shifting analysis "administratively useful" in §8(a)(3) cases
does not validate its use.215
208. Commentators and litigants have drawn an analogy to §8(a)(3) discrimination in the
context of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §2000e et seq. (1976). See Albemarlc
Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975) (Title VII class action seeking backpay and elimination of
pre-employment tests). The Supreme Court subsequently established a three-part causation test to
analyze employment discrimination under Title VII: first, the plaintiff establishes a primafacle case
of discrimination; second, the employer must then produce evidence of a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its employment decision; and third, the plaintiff must show that the proffered reason
was not the true reason for the employer's decision. The plaintiff retains the burden of persuasion at
all times. The employer has only a burden of production to rebut the presumption of discrimination.
See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-56 (1981) (sex discrimination
action under Title VII). Accord, Behring Intl, Inc. v. NLRB, 675 F.2d 83, 89 (3rd Cir. 1982) (in
§(a)(3) dual motive cases, "only the burden of production, and not persuasion, shifts to the defendant. Since the same considerations are present where the discrimination is based on union activity [as
in Title VII cases], the Board should follow the Burdine procedure . . . .").However, if judicial

deference is the primary rationale of Transportation Management, the Title VII analogy, albeit
logical and consistent, is irrelevant.
209. TransportationManagement, ..... U.S. at 103 S.Ct. at 2475 (quoting NLRB v. J.
Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 266-67 (1975); NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 236
(1963)). c.f. Belknap Inc. v. Hale, ... _.U.S. at -,
103 S.Ct. 3172, 3180 n.8 (1983) (the Board's
position regarding economic replacements is not firm and thus not deserving of deference).
210. See NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local 449, 353 U.S. 87,96 (1957).
211. See Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 491 (1951) (the courts must
determine "[w]hether on the record as a whole there is substantial evidence to support agency
findings.. .).
212. Section 10(e) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. §160(e) (1976), provides, in part: "The findings of the
Board with respect to questions offact if supported by substantial evidence on the record considered
as a whole shall be conclusive." (emphasis added).
213. Id. See also infra note 220 and accompanying text.
214. See Universal Camera,340 U.S. at 491; 29 U.S.C. §160(e) (1976).
215. See Transportation Management, 674 F.2d at 133 (Breyer, J., concurring). But see
NLRB v. Fixtures Mfg. Corp., 669 F.2d 547,550-51 n.4 (8th Cir. 1982) (burden allocation is an issue
best left to the agency).
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Even adamant critics of Wright Line do not suggest that the Board's
expertise should be entirely circumvented by the courts. 2 6 An appellate
court "cannot intrude upon the domain which Congress has exclusively
entrusted to an administrative agency."12 7 On the other hand, this should
not be construed as giving the administrative agency "carte blanche" to
promulgate rules.
Judge Breyer, in a concurring opinion in the First Circuit's Transportation Management decision, wrote that burden allocation is not a
question "to which a court should defer to agency views."2 18 Breyer reasoned that such an issue is a "pure question of law,"I 9 and, characterized
as such, should not be afforded immunity from judicial scrutiny. Congressional intent, as evidenced by the Administrative Procedure Act, supports a factual-versus-legal-review distinction to be followed by the
courts.

20

Thus, Congress made its intentions clear in determining that the
General Counsel retains the ultimate burden of persuasion in proving a
§8(a)(3) violation. The Supreme Court, in TransportationManagement,
opted instead for the deferral theory and acquiesced to the Board's expertise without confronting the legal issues sustaining the legitimacy of
Wright Line.
True Purpose/ActualMotive Test:
An Alternative CausationAnalysis
The "in part" and the "but for" causation tests fail to achieve an
equitable balance between the employee's right to organize and the
employer's right to run a business. Likewise, the Wright Line! Transportation Management causation test is inadequate in effectuating a rational
and uniform mode of analysis for alleged §8(a)(3) violations.
The solution is a simple one-step procedure which determines
whether an unlawful motive, or a legitimate business rationale, plays a
role in the employer's alleged discriminatory action. The quantum of
216. In Wright Line, the First Circuit rejected the Board's causation analysis but conceded that
"the Board's adoption of the Mi. Healthy test, to the extent that it establishes a new standard or set of
legal presumptions, is a ruling of law which we review for legal error, giving due deference to the
Board's expertise in interpreting the act it administers." Wright Line, 662 F.2d at 902 n.2.
217. Securities and Exchange Comm'n v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80,88 (1943)("[if an order
is Valid only as a determination of policy or judgment which the agency alone is authorized to
make and which it has not made, ajudicial judgment cannot be made to do service for an administrative judgment.").
218. TransportationManagement,674 F.2d at 133 (Breyer, J., concurring).
219. Id.
220. Title 5 U.S.C. §706 (1976) provides, in part: "The reviewing court shall decide all relevant
questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or
applicability of the terms of an agency action."
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proof necessary to prove a §8(a)(3) violation under this alternative
approach would be the familiar "preponderance of the evidence" standard. The proposed alternative causation test may be summarized as
follows:
(1) the General Counsel presents its evidence showing that the
employer's activity has violated the Act's provisions;
(2) the employer is given the opportunity to rebut the Board's evidence and to produce evidence showing that a violation has not occurred;
and,
(3) the Board employs a causation test to determine, by the preponderance of all the credible and relevant evidence, what role the
employer's true purpose or actual motive played in the incident.
The true purpose/actual motive test determines which motive
weighed more heavily in the employer's decision. If an anti-union animus
is found to be the employer's true purpose/ actual motive, then the action
violates §8(a)(3). However, if legitimate business reasons are the true
purpose/ actual motive for the employer's action, an unfair labor practice
has not been committed.
The true purpose/actual motive test omits the complexity, burden
shifting and legal sophistry of Wright Line. This alternative analysis
avoids the problems inherent in transplanting a causation test, designed to
protect fundamental rights, onto labor cases22' and achieves the balance
sought by the Act.m2
The language of the true purpose/actual motive causation test is
unambiguous and eschews the problems generated by the shifting burden
paradigm. Under the proposed test, the Board puts forth its case and the
employer attempts to show that his actions were based on legitimate
business concerns. The onerous requirement of establishing an affirmative
defense is irrelevant.22 Both parties need only put forward their evidence
and retain the normal opportunity to rebut opposing evidence. The Board
is well equipped to resolve a §8(a)(3) dispute using this proposed causation test.224
Support for this approach to §8(a)(3) cases is found in the Act's
legislative history and early Supreme Court decisions. Senator Pepper of
Florida, in a debate with Senator Taft of Ohio regarding the Taft-Hartley

221. See supranotes 158-78 and accompanying text.
222. See National Labor Relations Act §1, 29 U.S.C. §151 (1976).
223. See supranotes 141-44, 194-97 and accompanying text.
224. The Board has the "special function of applying the general provisions of the Act to the
complexities of industrial life." NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 236 (1963) (citations

omitted).
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Bill, 225 set forth a discussion on the utilitarian value of a true purpose/actual motive test. Pepper stated that the fundamental question at issue
before the Board is "what was the real reason for the discharge of the
employee. 22 6 This real reason, evidenced by the employer's motive, can
be determined by applying the proposed true purpose/actual motive test.
The Board examines all the evidence and has "a trial, the way a court
would, to determine what was in the mind of the employer when he fired
the worker."22 7 Furthermore, this alternative eliminates the need to'distinguish "pretext" from "dual-motive" cases.
Support for the true purpose/actual motive test is also evident in
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel,22 the first case interpreting the Act to
be heard by the Supreme Court. Chief Justice Hughes, delivering the
opinion of the Court, stated that the employer's "true purpose is the
subject of the investigation with full opportunity to show the facts."22 9 On
the same day that Jones & Laughlin was decided, the Court held in
Associated Press v. NLRB23o that the employei's "real motive" was decisive in the employer's discharge of the employee. The Court added that the
"Act permits a discharge for any reason other than union activity or
agitation for collective bargaining. ' 31
The Supreme Court also held in subsequent cases that the test for
determining union bias under §8(a)(3) is the "true purpose" or "real
motive" of the employer 232 and that the "'real motive' of the employer in
33
an alleged violation is decisive."2
Pre- Wright Line cases have successfully applied nearly identical causation language to the true purpose/ actual motive test. But since that
time, both the Board and the courts have drifted away from and ultimately abandoned this methodology.
225. See supra notes 204-07 and accompanying text. See generally93 CONG. REc. 6513-22
(1947), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 204, at 1586-98.
226, 93 CONG. REc 6514 (1947), reprintedin LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 204, at 1590.
227. Id. See also Du Ross, supra note 166, at 1125-26. The author compares the §8(a)(3)
causation test to the "an object" test mandated for §8(b)(4) boycotts. Du Ross continues that the
failure of Congress to amend §8(a)(3) "suggests that Congress intended to leave intact the 'true
purpose' test, which reflected in its very language the goal of identifying the employer's controlling
motivation." In an explanatory footnote: "Indeed, the House Report explicitly approved the Supreme
Court's reading of Section 8(a)(3) in the Jones & Laughlin case." H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st
Sess. 42-43 (1947), reprintedin LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 204, at 292, 333-34.
228. 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (upheld the constitutionality of §8(a)(3)).
229. Id. at 46.
230. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
231.
d at 132.
232. See Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17,42-43 (1954) (quoting Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 46; Associated Press, 301 U.S. at 132). This standard, albeit in a case dealing with
union-caused employer discrimination, is applicable to the typical §8(a)(3) allegation where the
employer's actions are the primary subject of inquiry.
233. NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 287 (1965) (citations omitted).
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CONCLUSION

The Board's Wright Line decision produced the opposite of its
intended result: the escalation of divergency and confusion among the
circuit courts ruling on §8(a)(3) cases. The Supreme Court's decision in
TransportationManagement, despite its legal fallibilities, unquestionably
resolves the dispute surrounding §8(a)(3) causation analysis. Transportation Managementunconditionally approves the burden shifting analysis of
Wright Line.
TransportationManagement enables employers and employees to
be cognizant of their fights, as well as the repercussions of their respective
actions, under §8(a)(3) of the Act. Practitioners also benefit by the certainty established in the context of legal causation of §8(a)(3).
The long-term benefit of Transportation Management, despite its
imperfections, is the consistency and predictability it will generate in
§8(a)(3) cases. However, the virtue of establishing such certainty is overshadowed by the Court's perfunctory opinion. The absence of a substantive legal analysis tarnishes the Court's decision. Perhaps the appropriate
conclusion drawn from TransportationManagement is, as Justice Brandeis once wrote in dissent, "in most matters it is more important that the
applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right."2 -4
Peter G. Albert

234. Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393,406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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